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Abstract
What is the relationship between trade and social institutions in the developing
world? The research literature is conflicted: importing firms may demand that
trading partners observe higher labor and environmental standards, or they may
penalize higher standards that raise costs. This study uses new data on retailers
and manufacturers to analyze how firm-level trade responds to information about
social standards. Contrary to the “race to the bottom” hypothesis, it finds that
retail importers reward exporters for complying with social standards. In difference-
in-differences estimates from over two thousand manufacturing establishments in 36
countries, achieving compliance is associated with a 4% [1%, 7%] average increase in
annual purchasing. The effect is driven largely by the apparel industry—a longterm
target of anti-sweatshop social movements—suggesting that activist campaigns can
shape patterns of global trade.
Replication materials. The data, code, and any additional materials required to
replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political
Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/2E2M9Z
Word count: 9,109
International trade shapes not only economic growth but also the social institutions
of trading countries. A research literature in political economy, going back at least
to Marx’s argument that free trade accelerates exploitation of labor and the col-
lapse of capitalism (Engels 1888), debates both the mechanisms and direction of its
impact. Contemporary scholarship has explored how international trade shapes tax-
ation (Garrett 1998), social spending (Rodrik 1998; Rudra 2008; Ansell 2008; Rickard
2012), health and environmental regulations (Vogel 1995; Drezner 2001), and labor
rights (Rudra 2005; Neumayer and De Soysa 2006; Mosley and Uno 2007; Greenhill,
Mosley and Prakash 2009; Mosley 2010).
This study contributes new evidence on one mechanism linking trade and so-
cial institutions: the market behavior of trading firms. If traders reward exporters
that exhibit lower labor and environmental standards, their behavior creates down-
ward pressure on these standards, contributing to a trade-led “race to the bottom.”
On the other hand, if trading firms prefer doing business with exporters that observe
higher standards, they may create incentives for exporters to improve standards.
These firm-level mechanisms are distinct from state-level mechanisms linking trade
to social institutions. Yet previous empirical research focuses largely on aggregate
national-level policies and labor market outcomes. The contribution of firm-level
mechanisms is therefore unknown.
We investigate how the social standards of exporters correlate with firm-level
trade. Examining retailers in advanced economies and several thousand manufactur-
ers in emerging markets, we detect surprising evidence of a preference for exporters
that observe higher standards. Importers purchase more from export factories that
comply with basic labor and environmental standards, contrary to what we would
expect from a firm-level race to the bottom. Difference-in-differences estimates show
that within-exporter improvements in compliance are associated with increased av-
erage order volume of 4% [1%, 7%], even after adjusting for variation in manufac-
turing performance.These findings suggest that in the markets we study either (a)
compliance with basic labor and environmental standards can be achieved without
sacrificing performance on price, delivery, or product quality, or (b) some importers
are willing to pay more to trade with socially compliant exporters.
The study cannot conclusively adjudicate between these interpretations. How-
ever, noting that the importers we study are primarily retailers and apparel brands
headquartered in advanced economies, we propose that anti-sweatshop social move-
ments may have prompted them to prefer purchasing from factories that comply
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with basic social standards. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the rela-
tionship between compliance and sourcing appears primarily in apparel, an industry
targeted by anti-sweatshop activism over the last three decades. Yet enforcing basic
standards through this mechanism has clear limitations. A majority of the studied
exporters remain noncompliant with basic standards. Despite evidence of a firm-level
preference for compliance, this incentive falls far short of guaranteeing basic labor
and environmental standards in global supply chains.
In addition to the research literature on trade and social standards, this study
contributes to longstanding debates surrounding the efficacy of “private regulation”
or “civic regulation” of multinational business (Elliott and Freeman 2003; O’Rourke
2003; Mattli and Bu¨the 2005; Bartley 2007; Vogel 2008; Mayer and Gereffi 2010;
Locke 2013). Private regulation refers to non-state systems of monitoring and en-
forcement of standards. As these institutions have become increasingly prevalent,
scholars have debated the extent and conditions under which private regulation can
supplement or even replace regulation by the state. Early scholarship suggested that
private regulation—supported by consumer and activist pressure—could drive higher
standards in trading jurisdictions that fell outside the reach of trade unions and effec-
tive regulatory agencies (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel 2001; Elliott and Freeman 2003).
Yet subsequent empirical research cast doubt on the efficacy of private regimes, find-
ing that major labor and environmental violations persisted in exporters subject to
private regulation (Vogel 2005; Locke, Qin and Brause 2007; Seidman 2007; Locke,
Amengual and Mangla 2009; Distelhorst et al. 2015).
Although previous research shows that many exporters fail to achieve compli-
ance with international codes of conduct, it is less informative about the economic
incentives created by transnational private regulation. Do these incentives reward
improving or declining standards? Our study affirms that many noncompliant facto-
ries participate in global supply chains, yet our findings also suggest that economic
incentives within these supply chains generate upward pressure on standards. Within
an industry subject to pressure from anti-sweatshop activism, exporting firms are on
average rewarded rather than punished for improving compliance with labor and en-
vironmental standards. The concluding section discusses the magnitude of this effect
and the investments in socially responsible practices it might offset.
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Trade-based diffusion of social institutions
The political economy literature is conflicted about the effects of trade on worker
rights and environmental protection. Some theories hold that pressures from inter-
national competition undermine costly protections for both workers and the envi-
ronment in a race to the bottom. Others suggest that international trade leads to
upward harmonization on standards, resulting in “California effects.” Yet uncer-
tainty surrounds not only the direction of trade’s impact, but also the mechanisms
that produce these effects.
To date, a significant body of research focuses on country-level mechanisms
and outcomes. Falling tariffs may foster competition between national economies
that extends to regulatory regimes. If domestic regulations impose cost disadvantages
on industry, governments may reduce regulation to protect domestic tax revenue and
employment (Drezner 2001). Several country-level empirical studies find that trade
openness undermines worker rights and bargaining power, especially in developing
countries (Mosley and Uno 2007; Rodrik 1997; Rudra 2005, 45-46). Yet alternative
measurement and identification strategies find either no relationship or the opposite
effect (Neumayer and De Soysa 2006; Vadlamannati 2015).
Another body of research notes that trade liberalization is often accompa-
nied by a negotiated harmonization of regulatory standards. When powerful states
also have higher standards, they may impose those standards on their trading part-
ners, leading to upward harmonization through trade liberalization (Vogel 1995).
Indeed, since 1950 roughly two-thirds of all preferential trade agreements include
provisions on social institutions, including labor rights, environmental protection,
and human rights (Hafner-Burton 2005; Milewicz et al. 2016). Country-level re-
search on trade also offers evidence of these “California effects” in both labor rights
(Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009) and human rights (Cao, Greenhill and Prakash
2013).
Firm-level mechanisms
The mechanisms discussed above function at the country-level through changes in
policy. Yet the market behavior of trading firms—rather than governments—may
generate similar pressures on labor and environmental practices. Managers decide
which firms they do business with, how to compensate workers, and how to dis-
pose of the waste they generate. The effects of trade therefore depend not only on
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how governments behave, but also on whether firms that observe higher regulatory
standards are rewarded or penalized by global markets.
One possibility is that firms that observe higher standards—like offering
higher wages or paying to mitigate their environmental impacts—are at a competi-
tive disadvantage in export markets. This view rests on two assumptions. The first
assumption is that, other things equal, observing higher labor and environmental
standards results in increased unit prices. For example, if an exporting firm increases
employee compensation to satisfy minimum wage regulations, it may pass increased
labor costs to its customers in the form of higher prices. The second assumption is
that customers (importers) are indifferent to the labor and environmental standards
of their suppliers. They are unwilling to pay higher prices to do business with com-
pliant exporters. Under these two conditions, we may observe a firm-level race to
the bottom as exporters seek price advantages by reducing compliance with labor
and environmental regulations (Rodrik 1997; Chan 2003; Mosley and Uno 2007; Weil
2014).
Alternatively, there is the possibility of firm-level “California effects.” Like
states, trading firms may also have preferences about the processes through which
the goods they import are produced. Activist campaigns are one possible driver
of these preferences. Social movements promoting environmental sustainability and
combatting worker exploitation attract consumer attention and threaten the value
of targeted firms (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel 2001; Elliott and Freeman 2003; Vo-
gel 2005; Bartley 2007; King and Soule 2007; Seidman 2007). Reputation-conscious
importers may therefore prefer to do business with exporters that comply with min-
imum standards in labor and environmental practices. This firm-level preference
would allow trade to drive higher standards in the absence of any government ac-
tion.
The emergence of transnational private regulation of global supply chains of-
fers suggestive evidence for this possibility. Activist campaigns around labor and en-
vironmental abuses have prompted many consumer-facing multinational enterprises
to establish “supply chain responsibility” programs (Vogel 2005; Bartley 2007; Vogel
2008; Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Levi et al. 2013; Locke 2013; Toffel, Short and Ouellet
2015). This typically entails establishing codes of conduct that govern working condi-
tions, environmental practices, and other international standards. Exporters seeking
to do business with these multinationals must agree to these standards and submit
to periodic audits. Private regulation of supply chains has spread from apparel and
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footwear to varied industries including consumer electronics (Distelhorst et al. 2015;
Nadvi and Raj-Reichert 2015), food and beverages (Coslovsky and Locke 2013), and
forestry (Bartley 2007).1 Unlike Fair Trade certification (De Janvry, McIntosh and
Sadoulet 2015), these compliance programs seek primarily to alter the production
processes of exporters, not necessarily increase their profits.
In comparison to the research literature on trade and social institutions at the
country-level, there is markedly less evidence on firm-level mechanisms (Figure 1).
The studies discussed in the previous section primarily use cross-national datasets
developed by Mosley (2010) and Kucera (2001) to measure the prevalence of labor
rights violations aggregated at the national level. These outcomes may be influenced
by state-level mechanisms, firm-level mechanisms, or a combination of the two.
[Figure 1 here]
Although previous research does not offer quantitative evidence on firm-level
mechanisms, scholarship on transnational private regulation casts doubt on its effi-
cacy. Studies have repeatedly found that noncompliant export factories remain in
supply chains even after multiple audits and corrective exercises (Locke, Qin and
Brause 2007; Locke 2013; Distelhorst et al. 2015).2 Consistent with one assumption
of the firm-level race to the bottom, these studies affirm that complying with higher
process standards—paying statutory minimum wages and benefits, mitigating pollu-
tion impacts, and offering safe factory infrastructure—increases costs (Mosley 2010;
Ruwanpura and Wrigley 2011; Barrientos 2013; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014).
Despite evidence that some consumers pay premiums for ethically produced goods
(Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira 2015), this scholarship also affirms the second
assumption, that importers are unwilling to pay more to do business with compliant
factories: “It seems inevitable that higher labor standards will increase production
costs, and many suppliers believe that addressing [social responsibility] issues makes
them less competitive” (Vogel 2005). Consistent with this view, reports by scholars,
activists, and NGOs continue to expose poor working conditions in export factories
1Although we have separated state-level and firm-level mechanisms in this discussion, private regu-
lation does not operate in a regulatory vacuum. There are complementarities between transnational
private regulation and domestic state-based regulation (Amengual 2010; Coslovsky and Locke 2013;
Amengual and Chirot 2016).
2In contrast to most of the literature, Harrison and Scorse (2010) found that the Indonesian
export industries most exposed to anti-sweatshop campaigns in the 1990s raised worker wages with
no discernible impact on employment.
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manufacturing for top retail brands, even when these factories are subject to codes
of conduct and compliance auditing by their customers (Chan, Pun and Selden 2013;
Workers Rights Consortium 2014).
Despite the sensibility of these critiques, empirical evidence on firm-level trade
and social institutions has been elusive. One noteworthy exception, Oka (2012),
found that reputation-conscious importers rewarded compliance by Cambodian ex-
porters with long-term sourcing relationships. However, this finding came from a
unique institutional setting—the Better Factories Cambodia program3—raising ques-
tions about its generalizability to exporters who cannot or do not participate in such
programs.
Research Design
If global supply chains exhibit a firm-level race to the bottom in labor and environ-
mental standards, importers should place more orders with low-standards exporters.
Yet there is also the possibility of firm-level California effects; if trading firms pre-
fer doing business with exporters that comply with higher labor and environmental
standards—and the effect of compliance on prices is either negligible or tolerable—we
expect the opposite pattern.
We test these hypotheses using a novel dataset on export transactions involv-
ing several thousand establishments provided by a global sourcing agent.4 Sourcing
agents play an important role in global supply chains by connecting importers with
exporters capable of producing goods at an acceptable price, quality level, and deliv-
ery schedule. The sourcing agent we study primarily serves retailers and wholesalers
headquartered in advanced economies (Figure 2).
[Figure 2 here]
Contemporary sourcing agents not only facilitate transactions; they also mon-
itor the compliance of exporters in the developing world with labor, environmental,
3Better Factories Cambodia (http://betterfactories.org/) is a factory monitoring and capability-
building program managed by the International Labour Organization and the International Finance
Corporation.
4The sourcing agent’s data were obtained and analyzed under the terms of a research agreement.
The agreement allowed the sourcing agent to mask its name and the names of its customers and
supplier factories in any published research.
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and legal standards. In response to importer demand, the sourcing company estab-
lished its own code of conduct, audited export factories for compliance with this
code, and reported the results to prospective importers. We use these factory au-
dits to measure exporter compliance with labor and environmental standards. Social
compliance auditing has many well-understood problems. Audits only capture a
snapshot of factory conditions, are only as good as the training of their auditors,
and are poorly-suited to evaluate and enforce process rights like the freedom of as-
sociation (O’Rourke 2003; Locke, Amengual and Mangla 2009; Anner 2012). Rather
than assume that audits offer a flawless picture of factory conditions, this study
adopts the more modest assumption that factories that exhibit higher compliance
scores are also, on average, more compliant than those that exhibit lower scores. In
the online supplement, we examine detailed audit result to help readers understand
what issues auditors actually detect and ensure our results are not driven by non-
credible items like freedom of association or non-discrimination. However, even if
readers remain skeptical of this approach, these audits serve as the primary source of
information available to potential importers about exporter labor and environmental
practices. Audit results are therefore an appropriate measure of exporter compliance
as perceived by importers.
Auditors inspect factories over one to two days to evaluate their practices
against the standards established in the code of conduct. They then assign the fac-
tory a letter grade on the scale “A” through “D”. The factories are also summarized
in thirteen separate compliance areas, such as “wages and benefits” and “work hours”
(Appendix Table A1). Factories rated A and B (28% of the factory-year observa-
tions in the main panel) are considered compliant, whereas those rated C and D are
noncompliant. Our analysis uses both the original four-point grading system and
this binary distinction between compliance and noncompliance, which eliminates the
assumption of equidistance between the four letter grades.
The sourcing agency also provided data on the value of customer orders placed
at each export manufacturer. These records were provided in annual sums and binned
into thirteen ranges, from under USD 50,000 to over USD 50 million.5 The midpoint
of each bin provides an estimate of the annual nominal value of buyer orders. These
5The boundaries of the thirteen annual order value bins were $0, $50k, $100k, $250k, $500k, $750k,
$1m, $5m, $10m, $20m, $30m, $40m, $50m, and over $50m. In addition to estimated annual order
values, Appendix Table A5 reports fitted linear probability models of exceeding the thresholds
defined by bin edges.
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estimates are then deflated to obtain order value in constant 2012 dollars.6 Within
this sample, most exports come from countries with poor freedom of association and
protection of labor rights (Figure 3).
[Figure 3 here]
In addition to annual order values and factory compliance data, the sourcing
agent provided information on factories’ locations, product types, delivery perfor-
mance, and product quality. Descriptive statistics on all variables appear in Ap-
pendix Table A1. The export factory panel is composed of factories with valid
compliance, order value, and manufacturing performance data in at least two years
over 2009-2012. The sourcing agent only records factory on-time delivery and quality
performance in years that it places orders at that factory. Therefore the main panel
represents only a subsample of the entire population of exporting factories. To en-
sure that findings are not idiosyncratic to factories with manufacturing performance
data, a second analysis examines all factories that appear in at least two years of the
panel.
Studying trade and social institutions in this sample has both advantages and
disadvantages. These exporter-importer transactions offer an appealing behavioral
measure of the economic incentives surrounding labor and environmental standards:
the decision by importers to place orders at factories. In contrast to previous studies
examining worker rights outcomes at the national level, this analysis isolates mech-
anisms operating at the firm level. Factory compliance with standards is measured
by inspections conducted by external auditors, rather then self-reporting by factory
management through surveys. In addition, the panel structure of these data offers
an opportunity to control for unobserved time-invariant features of factories and ge-
ographies. Finally, because the sourcing agent works with hundreds of importers
these empirical results also have improved external validity over the single-importer
studies that dominate the existing literature on transnational private regulation.7
6Deflators for USD-denominated orders were obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Import Price Index series for “Consumer Goods, Excluding Automotives”
(http://www.bls.gov/web/ximpim/beaimp.htm, accessed Oct 26, 2015). Analyzing non-deflated
nominal currency data does not significantly alter the results.
7One notable exception is Toffel, Short and Ouellet (2015), who analyze factory compliance in a
multi-importer context and find that prosocial attitudes and economic development in the home
countries of importers are associated with improved factory compliance with social standards.
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At the same time, this study is not a census of global supply chains. The
importers studied are primarily retailers, and apparel manufacturers account for 58%
of the exporter panel. This industry has been a target of anti-sweatshop campaigns,
a fact we exploit when exploring mechanisms. However, this suggests that results are
generalizable only to particular industries, not all global supply chains. In addition,
confidentiality considerations led the sourcing agency to provide only annual order
value at each factory. We therefore cannot decompose firm-level trade into quantities
and prices. This constrains analysis of the economic implications of our findings, as
discussed in the concluding section.
Firm-level trade and exporter compliance
Do importers prefer exporters with higher or lower workplace standards? We find
that compliant factories receive markedly more business than noncompliant factories
(Table 1). In 2012, 21% were rated compliant in at least half of their audits (some
factories are audited multiple times in a single year). On average, these factories
received 64% greater order value than those rated noncompliant. Average buyer
spend was USD 4.1 million in compliant factories, compared to USD 2.5 million in
noncompliant factories. Adjusted for factory size, compliant factories received $6,080
in orders per employee whereas non-compliant factories received $4,308.
[Table 1 here]
The rewards for compliance appear large in this cross-sectional analysis. How-
ever, this comparison may not represent a credible estimate of the relationship be-
tween compliance and importer purchasing decisions. Table 1 also compares other
qualities of compliant and noncompliant factories in 2012. They differ in many ways.
Chinese, Bangladeshi, and Indonesian factories are more likely to be found in the
noncompliant group. Compliant factories are more likely to manufacture clothing,
employ roughly one hundred (17%) more people on average, and exhibit superior
quality and on-time delivery performance.
Fitting an OLS model of order value using all variables in Table 1 as predic-
tors estimates smaller effects of factory compliance on orders: an increase of USD
926 thousand (Appendix Table A3). This estimate is more credible than the previ-
ous comparison, but it cannot exclude the possibility that unobserved factory-level
differences correlated with compliance levels are biasing effect estimates. For ex-
ample, it seems likely that—even after controlling for factory size and performance
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in on-time delivery and product quality—compliant factories may also enjoy advan-
tages in management practices, human capital, or technology that support superior
productivity (Bloom et al. 2013).
To account for time-invariant differences (country, product type, ownership,
etc.) across factories, we use the panel structure of the data to generate within-
factories estimates of the effect of changes in exporter compliance status on importer
purchasing behavior. The effect of compliance on orders is estimated by fitting a
standard two-way fixed effects regression model, both with and without time-varying
factory performance metrics.
Yit = ηi + δt + β1 Complianceit + εit(1)
Yit = ηi + δt + β1 Complianceit + β2 OnTimeit + β2 Qualityit + εit.(2)
Each model is fit using both the binary measure of compliance and the annual
average of the 4-point compliance score (A=3, B=2, C=1, D=0) as explanatory
variables. The left-hand panel of Table 2 (columns 1-4) fits these models using the
main factory panel summarized in Appendix Table A1. The center panel (columns
5-8) fits the same models on the subsample of factories that undergo changes in
compliance status during the period studied.
Under the twin assumptions that compliance raises unit prices and that im-
porters will not pay more to do business with compliant exporters, we expect that
when factories raise standards, they should lose business. Instead, we observe the
opposite pattern. Across both samples, achieving compliance is associated with an
increase in purchasing. This effect holds whether compliance is measured using the
raw four-point audit score or the binary compliance simplification. Adding controls
for manufacturing performance has almost no impact on effect magnitudes.
As noted above, not all factories have performance, sourcing, and compliance
data in at least two years of the panel. The rightmost section of Table 2 therefore
expands to include the larger panel of factories that have at least two years of compli-
ance and purchasing data. The main effects strengthen when we expand the sample
to include these factories (Columns 9 and 10). In the final two columns, we further
relax identification assumptions by adding factory-specific linear time trends to the
model (i.e. introducing j=5,722 linear time trend predictors corresponding to each
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factory in the panel).
Yit = ηi + δt + β1 Complianceit +
j∑
i=1
γi Trendi + εit(3)
[Table 2 here]
This model relaxes the parallel trends assumption in standard fixed effects
models, as biases introduced by divergent linear trends across groups are captured by
the factory-specific trends. To the extent that factory trends are correlated with any
exogenous changes in factory compliance, they will erroneously bias estimates of the
compliance toward zero. Columns 11 and 12 of Table 2 report point estimates that
are positive and similar in magnitude to estimations from the main panel. However,
these estimates are less precise, with 95% confidence intervals that include zero.
What is the economic significance of these effects? Table 3 reports effect mag-
nitudes from the main panel estimates in both dollars and percent of annual order
value. The models yield point estimates of increased order value ranging from USD
111,000 to 168,000 when an exporter transitions from noncompliant to compliant.
This represents a 4% average increase in annual order value. These figures estimate
annual purchasing using the midpoints of the annual purchasing bins provided by the
sourcing agent. We also report linear probability models of exceeding various order
thresholds in Appendix Table A5. These estimates find effects across several thresh-
olds. For example, compliance is associated with a 4.8% increase in the probability
of receiving more than $250,000 in annual orders. These analyses show that effects
are not driven by the high-uncertainty purchasing bins at the top of the distribution,
nor are they driven by one idiosyncratic transition between order bins.
The magnitude of the within-factories effect is modest, and our data also con-
firm that many noncompliant factories continue to operate in global supply chains.
Nonetheless we find evidence that importing firms in our sample prefer purchasing
from export factories that comply with minimum labor and environmental standards.
[Table 3 here]
Rewards and Penalties
Two incentive mechanisms may explain the effects detected above. First, importers
may increase purchasing when factories achieve compliance, rewarding factories for
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improvement. Second, they may reduce orders from factories that fall out of compli-
ance, penalizing exporters whose standards decline.
We next divide factories into four groups within each two-year period: com-
pliant in both years, falling out of compliance, moving into compliance, and non-
compliant in both years. Comparing the first two groups reveals penalties for falling
out of compliance. Comparing the latter two tells us whether there are rewards for
achieving compliance. The initial results of this analysis are ?isualized in Figure 4.
The top panel shows the raw results, and the bottom normalizes each year by the
within-year mean order value, which helps to visualize results from 2011-2012 when
overall orders increase for all groups. The figures suggest both negative incentives
(penalties) and positive incentives (rewards) for complying with standards.
[Figure 4 here]
[Figure 5 here]
To reduce pre-treatment differences between factory groupings, we then use
entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) to reweight the samples to achieve balanced
moments on a variety of covariates (Appendix Table A6). In the reweighted sam-
ples, factories that transition and maintain their compliance status exhibit identical
distributions of factory locations, product types, and initial-period order values. In
2010-2011 and 2011-2012, we also include the prior-year purchase value trend to
control for divergent trends pre-dating the compliance transition. The graphical
analysis in Figure 5 again shows relative declines for factories that fall out of com-
pliance (compared to those that stay compliant) and relative gains for factories that
achieve compliance (compared to those that stay noncompliant). Regression anal-
yses of the unbalanced and balanced samples for each two-year panel are reported
in Appendix Table A7. The effect of rebalancing on effect magnitude is mixed, but
the evidence across all estimations and years is consistent with positive incentives
for factories that achieve compliance and (weaker) penalties for those that fall out
of compliance.
Which industries exhibit compliance effects?
The firms in this study include exporters in a variety of product categories. We
use this variation to further test the plausibility of the results and explore possible
mechanisms. One possible explanation of the patterns above is that importers use
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the compliance results to avoid the reputational risk of dealing with exporters en-
gaged in socially harmful practices. Financial markets penalize firms for revelations
of environmentally harmful activities, industrial accidents, and activist campaigns
(Flammer 2013; King and Soule 2007). For consumer-facing firms like the retailers in
our study, the perception that their suppliers exploit workers or cause environmental
harm could have negative financial consequences.
Among the industries in this study, the global apparel industry has been
more exposed to anti-sweatshop activism (Bartley and Child 2014). Other common
product types like home furnishings (26% of exporters) and cookware (14%) have
not been subject to similarly intense campaigns. If the mechanism generating our
effects is the preference of certain importers to avoid non-compliant factories—rather
than compliance-transitions being correlated with some unobservable quality of the
product or factory—we expect effects to be strongest in industries targeted by activist
campaigns. If our effects were driven instead by industries that are not subject to
these campaigns, a different mechanism may be at work.
To explore this possibility, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by
exporter industry. Table 4 shows that the only exporter industry in which effects
are statistically different from zero is clothing. The effect magnitude of the binary
compliance measure is roughly triple the next largest estimates, from toys and other
products. This effect persists using both binary and continuous compliance indi-
cators, and examining either the entire panel (columns 1 and 2) or the subset of
factories that undergo compliance transitions (columns 3 and 4). This pattern is
consistent with a mechanism in which importers subject to activist pressure prefer
importing from compliant factories in order to reduce reputational risk.8
[Table 4 here]
Discussion
The importers in our study exhibit a preference for doing business with exporters
that comply with basic labor and environmental standards. This pattern is inconsis-
8Additional analyses and robustness checks appear in the online appendix. These include relaxing
the linearity assumption of performance controls, adding industry-specific trends in purchasing,
adding controls for the length of the relationship between the sourcing agent and the manufacturers,
and re-estimating effects in China and the rest of the world. The appendix also presents qualitative
summaries of the common violations of key audit items.
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tent with either one or the other following assumptions underlying the race-to-the-
bottom logic in global trade: (a) that compliance with basic labor and environmental
standards makes exporters less competitive in price, quality, or delivery, or (b) that
importers are unwilling to pay more to do business with compliant exporters. The
absence of quantities and prices in our data do not allow us to tell which of these
assumptions is inaccurate. We can say that they do not appear to simultaneously
obtain in this sample of retailers and export manufacturers.
Our results suggest the presence of economic incentives for complying with
social and environmental standards, whether these dynamics are driven by certain
exporters proactively improving compliance or by the demands and market power
of importers. Perhaps most surprising is that we observe these effects in emerging
markets with poor enforcement of labor and associational rights. In this study,
91% of the export transactions (by value) originate from countries in the bottom
two quartiles of fundamental labor rights, and 78% originate from countries in the
bottom quartile in freedom of association rights (Appendix Table A2).
Understanding these dynamics in global supply chains is important to un-
derstanding the contemporary nexus of trade and social institutions. International
trade is increasingly characterized by the prevalence of global supply (or value) chains
(Porter 1986; Gereffi and Sturgeon 2005). In 2009, intermediate inputs traded within
global supply chains accounted for 30% to 60% of national exports in G20 countries
(OECD, WTO, and World Bank Group 2014). As a growing share of trade takes
place within global supply chains, understanding their political economy is both the-
oretically relevant and of growing policy importance. The accompanying fragmenta-
tion and worldwide dispersion of production have created significant challenges for
traditional forms of regulation of labor and environmental standards.
We estimate that achieving compliance with basic standards results in im-
porters increasing annual order value by 4% on average (Table 3). Do these incen-
tives for compliance imply that raising workplace standards is a good investment
for emerging market exporters? The answer depends on whether the increase in
order value results primarily from increased quantities or prices.9 If the compli-
ance premium is due entirely to increased volume, and assuming momentarily that
compliance is costless and other costs scale with volume, the factory’s increase in
9In the following calculations, we assume that the 4% increase in buyer spend is uniform across
all customers of the exporter, even though our data only captures this relationship for the group of
importers represented by the sourcing company.
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operating profit is modest. Assuming a profit margin of 2%, this volume premium
would amount to an increase in gross profit by just 2% × 4% = .08%, before ac-
counting for any costs of compliance. Yet if the 4% increase in value is a price
premium, the same manufacturer’s profit margin would increase from 2% to 6.1%.
Decomposing the compliance premium into quantities and prices is therefore crucial
to understanding the implications for exporters.
To put these premiums in context, consider the costs of paying “living wages”
to emerging market manufacturing workers. The Fair Wear Foundation (2014) ex-
amined garment manufacturers in China and Vietnam and estimated paying a living
wage would require a 10% to 102% increase in mode sewing wages. In turn, these
wage increases would raise unit prices paid by importers by 2% to 12% (2014: 18).
A compliance premium of 4%, if partially composed of a price premium, could there-
fore offset the cost of living wages in some exporters. The prospects for doing so
appear greater in small exporters, where the compliance premium point estimate
ranges from 7%-10% of average order size (Figure 6).
[Figure 6 here]
The foregoing analysis of the economic returns to compliance is necessarily
somewhat speculative. Future work using more fine-grained data on prices and quan-
tities may clarify these returns and their implications for investments in improved
labor and environmental standards.
This study also suggests that transnational private regulation may be more
effective than previously believed. The analysis suggests the presence of economic in-
centives for compliance in industries characterized by strong activist campaigns and
private regulatory responses from industry. This finding complements new survey
research on the willingness of developing country producers to incur compliance costs
to integrate into global supply chains (Malesky and Mosley 2016). However, it also
raises new questions about private regulation in global supply chains. Are the incen-
tives detected here sufficient to support desired investments in worker wages, factory
safety, and environmental impact mitigation? What is the appropriate compliance
premium in both price and volume to justify these investments? Future research
may answer these questions and provide practical recommendations on the design
of multinational sourcing practices that support improved labor and environmental
standards.
This study is the first to estimate the relationship between exporter social
compliance and importer behavior in a large international sample of factories, but
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there are important limitations to keep in mind. First, we cannot tell whether we
observe these patterns because (a) certain exporters can achieve compliance with
minimum standards without raising prices, or (b) certain importers are willing to
pay more to do business with compliant exporters. We can only infer that both are
not simultaneously true. Second, because these data come from one sourcing agent,
they do not account for the entire portfolio of customers for each exporting factory.
These unobserved customers may be indifferent to social compliance or even reduce
orders when factories achieve compliance. In the latter case, the estimated effect of
compliance may represent a reallocation of business away from importers that are
insensitive to social compliance and toward importers in our study who are sensi-
tive to compliance. In this case, it seems likely that the reallocation occurs because
exporters perceive economic benefits to doing business with reputation-sensitive im-
porters, such as better prices or opportunities for growth. Addressing these possibil-
ities awaits future research using the administrative records of exporting factories,
rather than their customers. Third, the patterns observed here pertain to trade be-
tween retailers in western countries and exporters of light manufactures in emerging
markets. The study has little to say about incentives for compliance in other global
supply chains, such as those for electronics, minerals, or agricultural products, or
where both trading partners are based in developing or middle-income countries.
Although within-factories estimates from panel data offer improved causal
credibility over cross-sectional analyses, these models may also obscure alternative
causal pathways between compliance to importer behavior. If exporters build durable
reputations as either socially compliant or noncompliant, importers familiar with
these reputations may discount information transmitted through compliance au-
dits, reasoning that some year-on-year variation reflects measurement error rather
than meaningful improvement or declines. Consistent with this supposition, we find
smaller magnitude effects of compliance on factories that have longer business re-
lationships with the sourcing agent, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that
these effects are identical (Appendix Table A12). Panel fixed-effects models remove
any static effects from durable factory reputations. This reduces bias insofar as these
reputations reflect issues other than social compliance and are correlated with com-
pliance status in cross-section. However, if reputations for social responsibility are
themselves important drivers of customer orders, factory fixed-effects would mask
these relationships.
Keeping these limitations in mind, this research contributes new findings
16
to debates about a race to the bottom in global supply chains (Rodrik 1997; Vo-
gel 2005; Mosley 2010; Locke 2013; Weil 2014). The results suggest the possibil-
ity of a “high road” to growth for small exporters in emerging markets. Social
upgrading—achieving compliance with international labor, health, and environmen-
tal standards—may offer an opportunity for these enterprises to pursue more lucra-
tive opportunities in the global economy. Yet it is also clear that whatever market
incentives exist for such social upgrading, they are insufficient to bring the majority
of exporters in this study into compliance. Although the net impact of activist cam-
paigns and resulting private regulatory activities may be positive, this model still




Amengual, Matthew. 2010. “Complementary Labor Regulation: The Uncoordinated
Combination of State and Private Regulators in the Dominican Republic.” World
Development 38(3):405–414.
Amengual, Matthew and Laura Chirot. 2016. “Reinforcing the State: Transnational
and State Labor Regulation in Indonesia.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review
p. doi: 10.1177/0019793916654927.
Anner, Mark. 2012. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Associa-
tion Rights The Precarious Quest for Legitimacy and Control in Global Supply
Chains.” Politics & Society 40(4):609–644.
Ansell, Ben W. 2008. “Traders, teachers, and tyrants: democracy, globalization, and
public investment in education.” International Organization 62(2):289–322.
Barrientos, Stephanie. 2013. “Corporate Purchasing Practices in Global Production
Networks: A Socially Contested Terrain.” Geoforum 44:44–51.
Bartley, Tim. 2007. “Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise
of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions.”
American Journal of Sociology 113(2):297–351.
Bartley, Tim and Curtis Child. 2014. “Shaming the corporation: The social produc-
tion of targets and the anti-sweatshop movement.” American Sociological Review
79(4):653–679.
Bloom, Nicholas, Benn Eifert, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie and John Roberts.
2013. “Does Management Matter? Evidence from India.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 128(1):1–51.
Cao, Xun, Brian Greenhill and Aseem Prakash. 2013. “Where is the tipping point?
Bilateral trade and the diffusion of human rights.” British Journal of Political
Science 43(01):133–156.
Chan, Anita. 2003. “Racing to the bottom: international trade without a social
clause.” Third World Quarterly 24(6):1011–1028.
Chan, Jenny, Ngai Pun and Mark Selden. 2013. “The politics of global produc-
tion: Apple, Foxconn and China’s new working class.” New Technology, Work and
Employment 28(2):100–115.
Coslovsky, Salo V and Richard Locke. 2013. “Parallel Paths to Enforcement: Pri-
vate Compliance, Public Regulation, and Labor Standards in the Brazilian Sugar
Sector.” Politics & Society 41(4):497–526.
De Janvry, Alain, Craig McIntosh and Elisabeth Sadoulet. 2015. “Fair trade and
free entry: can a disequilibrium market serve as a development tool?” Review of
Economics and Statistics 97(3):567–573.
Distelhorst, Greg, Richard M Locke, Timea Pal and Hiram M Samel. 2015. “Pro-
duction Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local: Private regulation in the global
electronics industry.” Regulation & Governance 9:224–242.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2001. “Globalization and policy convergence.” International
Studies Review 3(1):53–78.
Elliott, Kimberly A. and Richard B. Freeman. 2003. Can Labor Standards Improve
18
Under Globalization? Peterson Institute.
Engels, Friedrich. 1888. On the Question of Free Trade: Preface for the 1888 English
edition pamphlet.
URL: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1888/free-trade/index.htm
Fair Wear Foundation. 2014. “Living Wage Engineering.”.
URL: http://goo.gl/p6ZVb0
Flammer, Caroline. 2013. “Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Re-
action: The Environmental Awareness of Investors.” Academy of Management
Journal 56(3):758–781.
Fung, Archon, Dara O’Rourke and Charles F. Sabel. 2001. Can We Put an End
to Sweatshops? A New Democracy Forum on Raising Global Labor Standards.
Beacon Press.
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global markets and national politics: collision course or
virtuous circle?” International Organization 52(4):787–824.
Gereffi, Gary, Humphrey John and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. “The governance of
global value chains.” Review of International Political Economy 12(1):78–104.
Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley and Aseem Prakash. 2009. “Trade-based diffusion
of labor rights: A panel study, 1986–2002.” American Political Science Review
103(04):669–690.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. “Trading human rights: How preferential
trade agreements influence government repression.” International Organization
59(3):593–629.
Hainmueller, Jens. 2012. “Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate
Reweighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies.” Po-
litical Analysis 20(1):25–46.
Hainmueller, Jens, Michael J Hiscox and Sandra Sequeira. 2015. “Consumer demand
for Fair Trade: evidence from a multistore field experiment.” Review of Economics
and Statistics 97(2):242–256.
Harrison, Ann and Jason Scorse. 2010. “Multinationals and Anti-Sweatshop Ac-
tivism.” The American Economic Review 100(1):247–273.
King, Brayden G and Sarah A Soule. 2007. “Social movements as extra-institutional
entrepreneurs: The effect of protests on stock price returns.” Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly 52(3):413–442.
Kucera, David. 2001. “The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labour Costs and
Foreign Direct Investment: Evaluating the Conventional Wisdom.” International
Labour Organization .
URL: https://goo.gl/dYalZC
Levi, Margaret, Christopher Adolph, Daniel Berliner, Aaron Erlich, Anne Greenleaf,
Milli Lake and Jennifer Noveck. 2013. “Aligning Rights and Interests: Why, When
and How to Uphold Labor Standards.” The World Bank: Background Paper For
The World Development Report 2013 .
URL: https://goo.gl/rsxNJu
Locke, Richard M. 2013. The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting
Labor Standards in a Global Economy. Cambridge University Press.
19
Locke, Richard M., Fei Qin and Alberto Brause. 2007. “Does Monitoring Improve
Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review
61(1):3–31.
Locke, Richard M., Matthew Amengual and Akshay Mangla. 2009. “Virtue out of
Necessity? Compliance, Commitment, and the Improvement of Labor Conditions
in Global Supply Chains.” Politics & Society 37(3):319.
Lund-Thomsen, Peter and Adam Lindgreen. 2014. “Corporate social responsibility
in global value chains: Where are we now and where are we going?” Journal of
Business Ethics 123(1):11–22.
Malesky, Edmund and Layna Mosley. 2016. “Chains of Love? Global Production,
Developing Country Firms and the Diffusion of Labor Standards.” Niehaus Center,
Princeton University: Workshop on The Politics of Multinational Firms, Govern-
ments, and Global Production Networks .
Mattli, Walter and Tim Bu¨the. 2005. “Accountability in Accounting? The Politics
of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest.” Governance 18(3):399–429.
Mayer, Frederick and Gary Gereffi. 2010. “Regulation and economic globalization:
Prospects and limits of private governance.” Business and Politics 12(3).
Milewicz, Karolina M., James Hollway, Claire Peacock and Duncan Snidal. 2016.
“Beyond trade: the expanding scope of the nontrade agenda in trade agreements.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution p. doi: 10.1177/0022002716662687.
Mosley, Layna. 2010. Labor Rights and Multinational Production. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Mosley, Layna and Saika Uno. 2007. “Racing to the bottom or climbing to the top?
Economic globalization and collective labor rights.” Comparative Political Studies
40(8):923–948.
Nadvi, Khalid and Gale Raj-Reichert. 2015. “Governing health and safety at lower
tiers of the computer industry global value chain.” Regulation & Governance 9:243–
258.
Neumayer, Eric and Indra De Soysa. 2006. “Globalization and the right to free
association and collective bargaining: An empirical analysis.” World Development
34(1):31–49.
OECD, WTO, and World Bank Group. 2014. Global Value Chains: Challenges,
Opportunities and Implications for Policy.
URL: https://www.oecd.org/tad/gvc report g20 july 2014.pdf
Oka, Chikako. 2012. “Does Better Labour Standard Compliance Pay? Linking
Labour Standard Compliance and Supplier Competitiveness.” Better Work Dis-
cussion Paper Series 5.
URL: https://goo.gl/gZtRF7
O’Rourke, Dara. 2003. “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Sys-
tems of Labor Standards and Monitoring.” Policy Studies Journal 31(1):1–29.
Porter, Michael E. 1986. “Changing patterns of international competition.” Califor-
nia Management Review 28(2):9–40.
Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. “Welfare versus subsidies: Governmental spending de-
cisions in an era of globalization.” The Journal of Politics 74(04):1171–1183.
20
Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Peterson Institute.
Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why do more open economies have bigger governments?”
Journal of Political Economy 106(5):997–1032.
Rudra, Nita. 2005. “Are workers in the developing world winners or losers in the
current era of globalization?” Studies in Comparative International Development
40(3):29–64.
Rudra, Nita. 2008. Who Really Gets Hurt? Globalization and the Race to the Bottom
in Developing Countries. Cambridge University Press.
Ruwanpura, Kanchana N and Neil Wrigley. 2011. “The Costs of Compliance? Views
of Sri Lankan Apparel Manufacturers in Times of Global Economic Crisis.” Journal
of Economic Geography 11(6):1031–1049.
Seidman, Gay. 2007. Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transna-
tional Activism. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
Toffel, Michael W, Jodi L Short and Melissa Ouellet. 2015. “Codes in context:
How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards.”
Regulation & Governance 9(3):205–223.
Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. 2015. “Rewards of (Dis) Integration Economic,
Social, and Political Globalization and Freedom of Association and Collective Bar-
gaining Rights of Workers in Developing Countries.” Industrial and Labor Relations
Review 68(1):3–27.
Vogel, David. 1995. Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation in a global
economy. Harvard University Press.
Vogel, David. 2005. The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate
social responsibility. Brookings Institution Press.
Vogel, David. 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation.” Annual Review of Political
Science 11:261–282.
Weil, David. 2014. The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many
and What Can Be Done to Improve It. Harvard University Press.
Workers Rights Consortium. 2014. Stealing from the Poor: Wage Theft in the Haitian
Apparel Industry. Research Report.
URL: https://goo.gl/odBHJY
21
Figure 1: Hypothesized mechanisms linking trade and social institutions
Trade leads to…
Race to the bottom
Downward harmonization of standards
“California effects”
Upward harmonization of standards
1 through the actions of...2
States Firms
States compete by 
reducing regulatory 
burdens




National policies set by states 
Vogel 1995, Rodrik 1997, 
Kucera 2001, Rudra 2002, 
2008, Greenhill, Mosley & 
Prakash 2009, Mosley 2010, 
Vadlamannati 2015.
Previous empirical research:
National outcomes (e.g. violations) shaped by both states and firms 
Kucera 2001, Neumayer & de Soysa 2006, Mosley & Uno 2007, 
Greenhill, Mosley & Prakash 2009, Mosley 2010, Vadlamannati 2015. 






This study focuses on 
firm-level mechanisms
22





















Purchasing share of retailers
North America, 73%
Western Europe, 19%








Notes. Estimated distribution of importer industries and headquarter locations in sourcing agent
data. Figure based on the top 200 importers in the sample, who account for an estimated 93% of
import volume over 2009-2012.










Percent of total purchasing, 2009−2012
Notes. Distribution of purchasing value by exporting country in sourcing agent data. Freedom of
association and labor rights country ratings from the World Justice Project, 2012-2013. Detailed
purchasing by country reported in Appendix Table A2.
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Figure 4: Order values by compliance trajectory, two-year panels
2009 to 2010 2010 to 2011 2011 to 2012
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Falls out of compliance
Moves into compliance
Noncompliant both years
Notes. Two-year panels of factory mean order value (logged thousand USD), sorted by factory
compliance trajectories. From top to bottom, factories are either (a) compliant in both years, (b)
compliant, then noncompliant, (c) noncompliant, then compliant, and (d) noncompliant in both
years. Bottom panel subtracts within-year order value means to aid interpretation. Note that
annual means vary by facet because each analysis includes only factories with observations in both
years. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5: Order values by compliance trajectory (entropy-balanced subsamples)
2009 to 2010 2010 to 2011 2011 to 2012
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Falls out of compliance
Moves into compliance
Noncompliant both years
Notes. Adjusting the analysis in Figure 4 using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012). Each
factory subsample is balanced on first-year order value, prior-year order value trend, distribution of
factory locations, and distribution of factory product-types. Note that pre-trends are not available
for balancing in 2009-2010 because we have no prior-year order value to establish trends. See
Appendix Table A7 for regression estimates and Appendix Table A6 for balance tables. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals.
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l lAll factories +performance controls
Switchers only +
performance controls
Notes. Effects of compliance on order value by factory size, estimated in panel mod-
els reported in the appendix. Factories are divided into two equally-sized pools by
average annual employment: small (4-293 employees) and large (293-11,105 employ-
ees). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Results also reported in Appendix
Table A11.
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Table 1: Cross-sectional comparison of compliant and noncompliant factories (2012)
Compliant Noncompliant Difference SE pval
Annual orders
Order value (thou. USD) $4,116 $2,504 -1,612 213 .000
Log order value 7.11 6.26 -.85 .07 .000
Factory location (binary indicators)
China .55 .63 .08 .02 .000
India .11 .08 -.03 .01 .021
Bangladesh .01 .08 .07 .01 .000
Indonesia .04 .05 .01 .01 .076
Vietnam .07 .04 -.03 .01 .001
Thailand .02 .03 0 .01 .432
Turkey .02 .02 0 0 .647
Philippines .02 .01 -.01 0 .185
Taiwan .04 .01 -.02 .01 .000
Cambodia .01 .01 0 0 .506
Pakistan .01 .01 0 0 .613
Other countries .11 .03 -.08 .01 .000
Products (binary indicators)
Clothing .59 .47 -.12 .02 .000
Furniture & homedecor .20 .20 .00 .01 .862
Toys .18 .17 -.01 .01 .598
Cookware .10 .10 -.01 .01 .393
Others .15 .24 .08 .01 .000
Factory size & performance
Employees 677 581 -96 36 .008
On-time delivery (%) .75 .71 -.04 .01 .000
Quality inspection (%) .94 .91 -.03 0 .000
Total factories 981 3,328
Share of sample 21% 79%
Notes. Standard errors and p-values from two-sided t-tests assuming unequal vari-
ances. Note that there are more factories in this cross-sectional 2012 sample than
the subsequent panel analysis, as the panel analysis excludes factories that appear
only once in the four-year panel. For regression analysis of order value using these
variables as predictors, see Appendix Table A3.
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Table 2: Panel estimates of effect of compliance on order value (logged USD, thousands)
Main panel: Main panel subsample: All factories
Factories with performance data Within-factory compl. transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Compliance .143 .143 .142 .139 .256 .126
(binary) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.055) (.081)
Compliance .093 .093 .095 .093 .161 .106
(A-D) (.035) (.034) (.036) (.036) (.039) (.059)
On-time delivery -.072 -.074 -.208 -.21
(.113) (.113) (.191) (.19)
Quality inspection -.087 -.089 -.375 -.376
-0.19 -0.19 (.344) (.343)
2010 fixed effect .016 .015 .018 .017 .197 .194 .201 .198 .093 .098 1.69 1.69
(.051) (.051) (.051) (.051) (.069) (.069) (.069) (.069) (.036) (.035) (.059) (.059)
2011 fixed effect -.105 -.105 -.106 -.105 .087 .091 .086 .091 .284 .286 3.15 3.15
(.059) (.058) (.059) (.058) (.081) (.081) (.081) (.081) (.040) (.040) (.071) (.071)
2012 fixed effect -.129 -.129 -.129 -.129 .140 .145 .143 .147 3.45 3.46 7.52 7.52
(.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.084) (.083) (.084) (.083) (.070) (.070) (.015) (.015)
Factory fixed effects X X X X X X X X X X X X
Factory time trends X X
Constant 6.6 6.8 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.4 6.8 7.3 2.8 2.6 3.8 3.7
(.043) (.193) (.062) (.196) (.057) (.359) (.077) (.360) (.033) (.06) (.068) (.097)
Observations 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 3,235 3,235 3,235 3,235 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956
R-squared .005 .005 .004 .005 .008 .010 .007 .009 .366 .365 .799 .799
Factories 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 1,028 1,028 1,028 1,028 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Models (1) – (4) fit using main panel of factories with performance
data (Table A1). Models (5) – (8) fit on subsample of the main panel that undergoes a transition in compliance status over
the period studied. Models (9) – (12) fit on all factories that appear at least twice in the panel, with 5,722 linear time-trends
corresponding to each factory in Models (11) and (12). Standard errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Table 3: Effects magnitudes from panel estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 5 Model 6
Point estimate $111 $110 $167 $164
(thousand USD)
95% CI Lower $31 $32 $55 $52
95% CI Upper $191 $190 $282 $278
Point estimate 4.21% 4.19% 4.42% 4.36%
(% of mean order value)
95% CI Lower 1.14% 1.15% 1.40% 1.35%
95% CI Upper 7.39% 7.36% 7.53% 7.48%
Notes. Average effects of moving from non-compliant to compliant on annual order
value, calculated from panel models estimated in Table 2. Percentages based on
mean order value among noncompliant factories in sample. Distributions of effect
magnitudes obtained through bootstrapping (B=1,000).
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Table 4: Effects of compliance by exporter industry (logged USD, thousands)
Main panel with Subsample:
performance data compl. transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Clothing × Compliance (binary) .190 .196
(.061) (.061)
Clothing × Compliance (A-D) .105 .106
(.042) (.044)
Furniture... × Compliance (binary) -.012 -.022
(.109) (.109)
Furniture... × Compliance (A-D) .047 .042
(.076) (.079)
Toys × Compliance (binary) .065 .051
(.103) (.103)
Toys × Compliance (A-D) .070 .031
(.078) (.079)
Cookware × Compliance (binary) .030 .030
(.113) (.112)
Cookware × Compliance (A-D) .004 .021
(.083) (.086)
Other prod. × Compliance (binary) .060 .063
(.294) (.299)
Other prod. × Compliance (A-D) -.020 .066
(.216) (.234)
Performance controls X X X X
Factory fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Constant 6.8 6.7 7.4 7.3
(.193) (.196) (.357) (.359)
Observations 6,915 6,915 3,235 3,235
R-squared .005 .005 .011 .009
Factories 2,447 2,447 1,028 1,028
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012, showing heterogeneous
effects by factory industry. Models (1) – (2) fit using main panel of factories with
performance data (Table A1). Models (3) – (4) fit on subsample of the main panel
that undergoes a transition in compliance status over the period studied. Standard
errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Online Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
These appendices present supplementary analysis for Distelhorst, G. and Locke, R. “Does
Compliance Pay?” American Journal of Political Science.
Table A1: Factory sourcing and compliance panel, 2009-2012
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Sourcing
Annual order value (thousand USD) 3026 5212 0 46440
Logged annual order value 6.61 2.12 0 10.75
Compliance
Compliance grade (A=3 ... D=0) 1.39 .65 0 3
Compliance binary (AB = 1, CD=0) .28 .45 0 1
Compliance by audit item
Health & Safety .27 .39 0 1
Work Hours .54 .47 0 1
Wages & Benefits .55 .46 0 1
Management .64 .44 0 1
Environmental .73 .42 0 1
Legal (permits etc.) .77 .4 0 1
Freedom of Association .95 .22 0 1
Discipline practices .96 .18 0 1
Illegal labor .96 .18 0 1
Subcontracting .98 .12 0 1
Child labor .99 .08 0 1
Forced labor .99 .1 0 1
Discrimination .99 .11 0 1
Factory location
China .58 .49 0 1
India .09 .28 0 1
Bangladesh .06 .23 0 1
Vietnam .05 .21 0 1
Indonesia .04 .19 0 1
Thailand .03 .17 0 1
Turkey .02 .15 0 1
Philippines .02 .14 0 1
Taiwan .02 .14 0 1
Cambodia .02 .14 0 1
Pakistan .01 .1 0 1
(Others) .06 .24 0 1
Factory products
Clothing .58 .49 0 1
Furniture & home decor .26 .44 0 1
Toys .18 .39 0 1
Cookware .14 .35 0 1
(Others) .09 .28 0 1
Factory size and performance
Employees 660 979 3 13,221
On time delivery (%) .72 .26 0 1




Table A2: Labor rights and exports in sourcing agent data
Fundamental labor rights Freedom of association/assembly






Dom. Rep. 20.7 .07
Hong Kong 11.3 .04 Indonesia 1458.7 4.97
Korea 61.8 .21 Korea 61.8 .21
Madagascar 25.1 .09 Peru 10.7 .04
Poland 3.5 .01 Poland 3.5 .01




Dom. Rep. 20.7 .07
10%
Brazil 3.9 .01
Mexico 167.4 .57 El Salvador 7.9 .03
Morocco 10.5 .04 India 1701.4 5.79
Nicaragua 74.5 .25 Kenya 78.3 .27
Philippines 549.0 1.87 Morocco 10.5 .04
Portugal 147.4 .50 Philippines 549.0 1.87








China 15818.8 53.86 Egypt 91.1 .31
Colombia 23.2 .08 Georgia 9.1 .03
El Salvador 7.9 .03 Guatemala 446.0 1.52
Georgia 9.1 .03 Jordan 267.9 .91
India 1701.4 5.79 Macedonia 10.4 .04
Indonesia 1458.7 4.97 Madagascar 25.1 .09
Macedonia 10.4 .04 Mexico 167.4 .57
Malaysia 283.8 .97 Sri Lanka 248.8 .85








Egypt 91.1 .31 Cambodia 998.7 3.40
Guatemala 446.0 1.52 China 15818.8 53.86
Jordan 267.9 .91 Hong Kong 11.3 .04
Kenya 78.3 .27 Malaysia 283.8 .97
Pakistan 188.0 .64 Nicaragua 74.5 .25
Peru 10.7 .04 Pakistan 188.0 .64
Turkey 955.2 3.25 Turkey 955.2 3.25
Vietnam 2545.5 8.67 Vietnam 2545.5 8.67
Notes. Share of export transactions originating from each country, sorted by level of respect
for labor rights and freedom of association in sourcing agent database, 2009-2012. Ratings of
labor rights and freedom of association from the World Justice Project, 2012-2013. Percent-
ages sum to less than unity because thirteen countries present in the sourcing dataset are
omitted from the World Justice Project: Bahrain, Haiti, Honduras, Laos, Lesotho, Lithuania,
Macau, Mauritius, Oman, Slovakia, Swaziland, Taiwan, and Turkmenistan. Countries with
less than 1m USD total export value also excluded from this table.
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Table A3: Cross-sectional analysis of order value and compliance (2012)
(1) (2)
DV Logged order value Order value



































Other products .156 -92
(.107) (201)
Factory size and performance
Employees .000 1.543
(.000) (.205)
On-time delivery .192 971
(.117) (212)






Notes. OLS regression on factory data from 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A4: Main results: robustness with additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Compliance .138 .134 .131
(binary) (.047) (.046) (.046)
Compliance .087 .086 .084
(A-D) (.034) (.033) (.033)
Flexible performance controls
On-time delivery 4.408 4.405 4.474 4.470 4.431 4.427
(.346) (.346) (.351) (.351) (.349) (.349)
(squared) -3.879 -3.877 -3.925 -3.923 -3.888 -3.887
(.285) (.285) (.288) (.288) (.286) (.286)
Quality inspection 4.822 4.816 4.891 4.883 4.866 4.859
(.742) (.746) (.741) (.744) (.741) (.744)
(squared) -3.317 -3.314 -3.381 -3.377 -3.362 -3.358
(.522) (.524) (.522) (.524) (.521) (.523)
Industry time-trends
Clothing trend .089 .089 .099 .098
(.052) (.052) (.051) (.051)
Furniture trend .027 .028 .032 .033
(.049) (.049) (.049) (.049)
Toys trend .149 .151 .159 .161
(.049) (.049) (.050) (.050)
Cookware trend .098 .096 .105 .103
(.050) (.050) (.050) (.050)
Other prod. trend -.371 -.372 -.377 -.378
(.114) (.114) (.114) (.114)





Year fixed effects X X X X X X
Factory fixed effects X X X X X X
Constant 4.172 4.095 4.108 4.030 4.338 4.263
(.271) (.277) (.272) (.277) (.287) (.292)
Observations 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,913 6,913
R-squared .049 .049 .062 .061 .063 .062
Factories 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,446 2,446
Notes. Replicating main effects of compliance on order value (logged USD, thousands) reported in Table
2 adding controls for non-linear relationship between performance metrics and purchasing, industry-specific
trends in purchasing, and the length of the business relationship between factory and sourcing agent. Standard
errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Table A5: Linear probability models of exceeding order value thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Binary dependent variables:
Order value greater than... $0 $50,000 $100,000 $250,000 $500,000 $750,000 $1,000,000 $5,000,000 $10,000,000
Compliance .005 .019 .031 .048 .030 .027 .011 .006 .001
(binary) (.005) (.008) (.010) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.009) (.007)
On-time delivery -.012 .006 .034 -.000 -.027 -.022 -.030 -.020 .007
(.009) (.026) (.031) (.031) (.030) (.029) (.028) (.014) (.008)
Quality inspection -.002 -.056 .010 -.017 -.045 -.022 .001 .016 -.006
(.014) (.046) (.056) (.057) (.052) (.048) (.044) (.024) (.012)
2010 fixed effect -.023 -.022 -.013 .008 .023 .028 .034 .035 .025
(.005) (.009) (.011) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.009) (.007)
2011 fixed effect -.048 -.038 -.025 .003 .024 .027 .025 .042 .032
(.006) (.010) (.011) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.010) (.008)
2012 fixed effect -.066 -.057 -.038 .008 .035 .055 .054 .062 .038
(.007) (.010) (.012) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.011) (.008)
Factory fixed effects X X X X X X X X X
Constant 1.016 .976 .818 .706 .623 .511 .439 .112 .037
(.014) (.044) (.055) (.057) (.052) (.048) (.046) (.024) (.014)
Observations 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915 6,915
R-squared .027 .010 .005 .004 .003 .005 .005 .010 .008
Factories 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Dependent variables are binary indicators of whether each factory
exceeded various thresholds of annual order value. The thresholds are defined by the annual order value bins defined by the sourcing
agent in their data disclosure. Standard errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Table A6: Pre- and post-entropy-balancing covariate means
Factory Panel A: Decliners Factory Panel B: Improvers
Stays compliant Declines Improves Stays noncompliant
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
2009-2010 panel
ln(2009 order value) 4.199 3.696 4.199 3.322 2.968 3.322
Bangladesh .06 .04 .06 .028 .059 .028
Cambodia .016 .03 .016 .026 .008 .026
China .42 .542 .42 .621 .583 .621
India .113 .086 .113 .07 .084 .07
Indonesia .019 .076 .019 .038 .072 .038
Pakistan .005 .01 .005 .002 .01 .002
Philippines .005 .033 .005 .011 .021 .011
Taiwan .027 .023 .027 .032 .012 .032
Thailand .038 .02 .038 .021 .035 .021
Turkey .03 .013 .03 .013 .019 .013
Vietnam .11 .05 .11 .06 .042 .06
Clothing .736 .741 .736 .632 .533 .632
Cookware .129 .106 .129 .126 .127 .126
Furniturehomedec .176 .173 .176 .209 .254 .209
Toys .129 .136 .129 .179 .158 .179
Other products .085 .07 .085 .102 .147 .102
2010-2011 panel
ln(2010 order value) 4.708 4.27 4.707 3.984 3.717 3.981
Pre-trend (2009-2010) .336 .476 .336 .34 .197 .34
Bangladesh .023 .067 .023 .016 .074 .017
Cambodia .029 .015 .029 .013 .012 .013
China .485 .581 .485 .564 .54 .563
India .076 .101 .076 .095 .085 .095
Indonesia .029 .032 .029 .059 .088 .059
Pakistan 0 .005 0 .013 .009 .013
Philippines .009 .01 .009 .026 .026 .026
Taiwan .049 .02 .049 .026 .009 .026
Thailand .026 .027 .026 .026 .043 .026
Turkey .029 .01 .029 .02 .02 .02
Vietnam .09 .069 .09 .046 .045 .046
Clothing .689 .704 .689 .666 .601 .665
Cookware .148 .133 .148 .108 .141 .108
Furniture .221 .207 .221 .243 .252 .243
Toys .166 .163 .166 .216 .156 .216
Other products .078 .059 .078 .092 .087 .092
2011-2012 panel
ln(2011 order value) 4.199 3.972 4.199 3.648 3.617 3.647
Pre-trend (2010-2011) .558 .284 .558 .271 .373 .271
Bangladesh .013 .03 .013 .011 .105 .011
Cambodia .013 .033 .013 .011 .012 .011
China .503 .605 .503 .569 .574 .568
India .069 .082 .069 .118 .084 .118
Indonesia .044 .052 .044 .052 .071 .052
Pakistan .016 .011 .016 .011 .007 .011
Philippines .025 .016 .025 .022 .016 .022
Taiwan .053 .027 .053 .03 .005 .03
Thailand .022 .027 .022 .033 .037 .033
Turkey .025 .025 .025 .014 .016 .014
Vietnam .075 .052 .075 .077 .04 .077
Clothing .678 .625 .678 .626 .595 .626
Cookware .122 .142 .122 .132 .113 .132
Furniture .225 .271 .225 .209 .227 .209
Toys .188 .23 .188 .168 .163 .168
Other products .094 .088 .094 .102 .118 .102
Notes. Results of entropy balancing on pre-treatment covariates for the analyses reported in
Figure 5 and Appendix Table A7. Left panel shows factories that start the panel compliant
and either maintain compliance or fall out of compliance (decline). Right panel shows facto-
ries that start the panel noncompliant and either come into compliance (improve) or remain
noncompliant. Reweighting the factory samples using entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012)
yields balanced samples on initial period order value, factory location, factory products, and
pre-trends in purchasing (2010-2012 only).
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Table A7: Two-year panel models, original and entropy-balanced subsamples
Panel 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Subsample Original Improvers Decliners Combined Original Improvers Decliners Combined Original Improvers Decliners Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Compliance .136 .274 .128 .121 .221 .195 .0836 .0813 .158 .389 .559 .320
(.0569) (.0868) (.149) (.0665) (.0508) (.0789) (.0931) (.0482) (.123) (.247) (.334) (.160)
2010 FE .279 .190 .367 .306
(.0328) (.0473) (.0926) (.0415)
2011 FE .253 -.172 -.0594 -.0862
(.0303) (.0463) (.0592) (.0307)
2012 FE 3.183 3.062 3.365 3.166
(.0654) (.122) (.234) (.103)
Constant 3.267 3.322 4.071 3.630 3.004 3.983 4.624 4.324 3.194 3.647 3.640 3.756
(.0225) (.0217) (.145) (.0304) (.0217) (.0197) (.0915) (.0279) (.0438) (.0618) (.343) (.0897)
Factory FE X X X X X X X X X X X X
Entropy balancing X X X X X X X X X
...including pre-trends X X X X X X
Observations 5,106 3,776 1,330 5,106 6,932 2,554 1,500 4,054 7,040 3,398 1,370 4,768
R-squared .032 .045 .031 .037 .024 .010 .009 .008 .403 .395 .375 .385
Number of fcode 2,553 1,888 665 2,553 3,466 1,277 750 2,027 3,520 1,699 685 2,384
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression in two-year panels. The dependent variable is logged annual order values in 2012
constant dollars. Regression coefficients shown with robust standard errors clustered by factory in parentheses. Columns 1,
5 and 9 show the results from the unweighted panel data. Remaining columns estimated on factory subsamples reweighted
by entropy balancing. 2009-2010 subsample balanced using initial-year order value, distribution of factory locations, and
distribution of factory product-types. 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 include these variables and prior-year purchasing trends.
(E.g. for 2010-2011, the pre-rend is the difference between 2009 and 2010 order value.) For these panels, the re-weighted
samples have fewer observations because not all factories have prior-year orders to estimate trends. “Improvers” includes
all factories that start the panel noncompliant (identified on factory transitions into compliance). “Decliners” includes all
factories that start the panel compliant (identified on factory transitions out of compliance). Columns 4, 8, and 12 show
estimates from the combined weighted samples. Note the increased R2 in the 2011-2012 panel results from the large increase
in total order value in 2012, variation that is explained by the year fixed effect.
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Table A8: Effects of individual compliance items on annual order value
(1) (2)
Child labor -0.29 -0.29
(0.34) (0.34)
Illegal labor -0.17 -0.17
(0.21) (0.21)
Forced labor -0.38 -0.38
(0.41) (0.41)








Wages & Benefits 0.15 0.15
(0.07) (0.07)
Work Hours -0.04 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08)
Freedom of Association -0.05 -0.05
(0.19) (0.19)










Year FE X X





Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Dependent variable is
ln(annual order value) in thousand USD in 2012 constant dollars. Model estimated:
Yit = ηi + δt + β1 ChildLaborit + β2 IllegalLaborit + ... + β13 Managementit + εit
Standard errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Table A9: Full sample effects, China only, and rest of world
Main panel China only Rest of world
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Compliance (binary) .143 .159 .113
(.048) (.053) (.090)
Compliance (A-D) .093 .102 .080
(.034) (.041) (.058)
On-time delivery -.072 -.074 .107 .103 -.267 -.266
(.113) (.113) (.161) (.161) (.156) (.156)
Quality inspection -.087 -.089 -.028 -.025 -.276 -.285
(.190) (.190) (.208) (.208) (.429) (.427)
2010.audityr .015 .017 .099 .103 -.099 -.099
(.051) (.051) (.060) (.060) (.088) (.087)
2011.audityr -.105 -.105 -.027 -.026 -.205 -.206
(.058) (.058) (.068) (.068) (.101) (.102)
2012.audityr -.129 -.129 -.037 -.033 -.245 -.247
(.062) (.062) (.076) (.076) (.103) (.103)
Factory fixed effects X X X X X X
Constant 6.8 6.7 6.4 6.3 7.3 7.2
(.193) (.196) (.222) (.224) (.415) (.418)
Observations 6,915 6,915 4,040 4,040 2,875 2,875
R-squared .005 .005 .006 .005 .008 .008
Factories 2,447 2,447 1,449 1,449 998 998
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Dependent variable is ln(annual
order value) in thousand USD in 2012 constant dollars. Standard errors clustered by factory in
parentheses.
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Table A10: Effects of compliance on order value by factory size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small factory × compliance .123 .122 .115 .112
(.060) (.060) (.060) (.060)
Large factory × compliance .160 .160 .164 .162
(.071) (.071) (.071) (.071)
On-time delivery -.041 -.205
(.114) (.191)
Quality inspection -.131 -.406
(.191) (.346)
2010 fixed effect .070 .070 .211 .209
(.052) (.052) (.069) (.069)
2011 fixed effect -.040 -.039 .103 .108
(.063) (.063) (.084) (.083)
2012 fixed effect -.068 -.067 .152 .157
(.063) (.063) (.084) (.083)
Constant 6.622 6.772 6.882 7.414
(.044) (.196) (.057) (.361)
Factory FE X X X X
Observations 6,646 6,646 3,225 3,225
Factories 2,335 2,335 1,024 1,024
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Dependent variable
is ln(annual order value) in thousand USD. Small factories range from 4 to 293
employees. Large factories range from 293 to 11,105 employees. Size boundaries
determined to create two factory pools of equal size. Standard errors clustered by
factory in parentheses.
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Table A11: Effect magnitudes by factory size
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Small factories (4-293 employees)
Point estimate $97 $96 $134 $133
(thousand USD)
95% CI Lower $4 $3 -$7 -$10
95% CI Upper $202 $202 $286 $288
Point estimate 7.72% 7.46% 10.42% 10.33%
(% of order value)
95% CI Lower 0.30% 0.24% -0.54% -0.77%
95% CI Upper 15.85% 15.85% 22.51% 22.59%
Large factories (293-11,105 employees)
Point estimate $131 $131 $200 $202
(thousand USD)
95% CI Lower $19 $19 $36 $37
95% CI Upper $256 $254 $382 $385
Point estimate 3.19% 3.18% 4.86% 4.90%
(% of order value)
95% CI Lower 0.45% 0.46% 0.86% 0.90%
95% CI Upper 6.31% 6.25% 9.48% 9.54%
Notes. Effect magnitude estimates calculated from models fit in Appendix Table
A10. Small factories average 124 employees. Large factories average 1,113 employees.
Distributions obtained using the bootstrap method (B=1,000). Results visualized in
Figure 6.
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Table A12: Effects of compliance by length of sourcing relationship
Main panel with Subsample:
performance data compl. transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Start of relationship to sourcing agent...
2008 or earlier .108 .106
× Compliance (binary) (.055) (.055)
2009 or later .242 .234
× Compliance (binary) (.100) (.099)
2008 or earlier .077 .073
× Compliance (A-D) (.040) (.042)
2009 or later .137 .148
× Compliance (A-D) (.069) (.069)
On-time delivery -.070 -.073 -.202 -.206
(.113) (.113) (.190) (.190)
Quality inspection -.085 -.089 -.369 -.376
(.190) (.190) (.343) (.343)
2010 fixed effect .017 .017 .197 .199
(.051) (.051) (.069) (.069)
2011 fixed effect -.105 -.106 .090 .089
(.058) (.059) (.081) (.081)
2012 fixed effect -.129 -.129 .144 .147
(.062) (.062) (.083) (.083)
Factory fixed effects X X X X
Constant 6.8 6.7 7.4 7.3
(.193) (.196) (.358) (.359)
Observations 6,913 6,913 3,235 3,235
R-squared .005 .005 .010 .009
Factories 2,446 2,446 1,028 1,028
Notes. OLS panel fixed effects regression from 2009 to 2012. Dependent variable is
ln(annual order value) in thousand USD. Factories divided into two groups based on
whether the sourcing agent has imported from the factory in any year prior to the
start of our panel (2009). Although effect magnitudes are larger for factories with
shorter relationships, we cannot reject the hypothesis that effects are identical across
the two groups. Standard errors clustered by factory in parentheses.
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Percent change in annual order value
Notes. Estimated effects of compliance by audit item, estimated with the bootstrap
method (B=1,000) using panel estimations reported in Appendix Table A8. For
completeness we include all thirteen indicators, although the confidence intervals for
several low variance items are so large as to be able to say little about the direction
or magnitude of the effect. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Appendix B: Effects of individual compliance items
This section provides additional detail on the effects of individual compliance items
reported in Figure A1 and Appendix Table A8. For many of the audit items, the
estimated effects have very wide confidence intervals. This leads to great uncertainty
about the direction and magnitude of effects of compliance items in freedom of as-
sociation, discrimination, illegal labor, subcontracting, child labor, and forced labor.
The imprecision of these estimates comes in part from the low variation in these
items. Each has an average compliance rate of 95% or higher (Appendix Table A1).
Given the widespread violations of freedom of association in countries like China,
these compliance rates should be interpreted with great skepticism.

























































Notes. Word size corresponds to frequency of appearance in auditor comments when
assessing noncompliance with environmental standards.
Environmental compliance is associated with a 6% annual increase in buyer
orders (USD 155,000). The most common terms appearing in auditor comments
appear in Figure B1. Environmental standards in these audits include obtaining
the relevant permits from local regulators to certify a factory’s environmental im-
pact. They also cover the proper handling and disposal of hazardous waste. Auditor
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comments on environmental violations included: pollution control certificate expired ;
hazardous wastes not disposed by licensed contractor ; discharges wastewater without
treatment ; and waste air from spraying workshop emitted to atmosphere without any
proper treatment.
Compliance with wage and benefits standards is associated with a 5% increase
in annual order value (USD 129,000). Wage standards include paying at least the
local minimum wage, paying the appropriate premiums for overtime and weekend
work, offering statutory social insurance benefits, and providing accurate records of
worker wages (Figure B2). Example violations cited in audits include: lowest wages
paid was RMB840/month, which was less than the local minimum wage standard ;
salary payment in Feb 2011 for employees who worked full month (24 days) was less
than in labor contract ; and factory calculated overtime compensation based on 208
working hours instead of 192 working hours.


























































Notes. Word size corresponds to frequency of appearance in auditor comments when
assessing noncompliance with wage and benefit standards.
A third predictor of increased order value is health and safety compliance
(4%, USD 98,000). This is the most complex standard in the audit, with over twenty
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Notes. Word size corresponds to frequency of appearance in auditor comments when
assessing noncompliance with health and safety standards.
subcategories. The most common terms in auditor comments appear in Figure B3.
Disaster preparedness is one major component, including the accessibility of fire exits,
emergency lighting, and fire-fighting equipment. Example violations included: Exit
in the Finishing area blocked with finished goods ; and No emergency lights...No fire
alarm at dormitory. Another element of health and safety is the provision of personal
protective equipment such as facemasks and the use of appropriate machine-guarding
to prevent industrial accidents. Example findings included: All spraying operators
work without respiratory mask ; All sewing machines not equipped with needle guards ;
and No effective eye wash station was available in paint-spraying workshop. Buyer
sensitivity to problems with workplace safety is unsurprising. Unsafe working condi-
tions in recent years have cost hundreds of supply chain workers their lives, from the
Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh to fatal factory explosions at electronics
suppliers in China. However, the compliance item here focuses largely on disaster
preparedness and safety around machines and chemicals, rather than the structural
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integrity of factory buildings.
Legal compliance exhibits a similar effect magnitude (4%), but its 95% confi-
dence interval crosses zero (-2%, 9%). Legal compliance largely addresses two issues.
First, it examines whether the factory has obtained the proper permits, licenses, and
certificates. For example, one auditor reported: Found factory business license / tax
certificate address not match with factory actual location. Second, legal compliance
also records whether factory management attempted to deceive compliance auditors.
Example violations included, 2 sets of time records found and Double book atten-
dance records were found during the audit. The word cloud shows that these cases
of detected deception are rarer than citations for licensing issues.
Finally, the point estimate for disciplinary measures compliance is similar to
the others but imprecisely estimated, with a confidence interval ranging from -4% to
12%. Disciplinary practice standards forbid factories from using corporal punishment
or public embarrassment as techniques for controlling employee behavior.
None of the effect estimates for the remaining predictors approach statistical
significance. The insensitivity of buyer orders to work hours compliance despite a
high rate of violations (46%) merits some discussion. Most factories in the panel
are located in China. Chinese labor laws permit just 36 hours of monthly overtime.
However, workers (with an interest in maximizing earnings) and employers (with an
interest in scaling production volumes without hiring new workers) often see benefit
in violating these laws. In the absence of local regulatory enforcement, factories
often aim for 60-80 hours of monthly overtime for production workers. Violations of
China’s work hours regulations are therefore often viewed as unremarkable. Indeed,
we find that buyers appear to ignore these violations when making sourcing decisions.
Given the importance of freedom of association in activist critiques of global
production, it may seem surprising that buyers are insensitive to this item. However,
previous research suggests that freedom of association as measured by compliance
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auditing regimes is not particularly meaningful. Buyer-driven audits are unlikely to
detect violations of association rights (Anner 2012), and compliance with freedom of
association standards in labor repressive settings like China often may involve rel-
atively superficial measures (Distelhorst et al. 2015). Indeed, the panel shows 95%
compliance with freedom of association standards despite a preponderance of facto-
ries in mainland China. These shortcomings may render buyers relatively indifferent
to freedom of association findings in compliance audits.
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